Judo Economics Reconsidered: Capacity Limitation, Entry and Collusion
AbstractThe capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game. If the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry, it may not practice "judo economics" but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market. This occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 18/95.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
More information through EDIRC
OLIGOPOLIES; INVESTMENTS; GAMES;
Other versions of this item:
- Sorgard, Lars, 1997. "Judo economics reconsidered: Capacity limitation, entry and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 349-368, May.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/300, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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