Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model is analyzed. The standard model is modified to include a list pricing stage and a subsequent price discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide to lower the price, or not, in a subsequent discounting stage. List pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces the pure strategy outcome. It is shown that for a general class of rationing rules there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that involves both firms playing pure strategies. This equilibrium payoff dominates any other sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, we show that the small firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number
we034918.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan, 1992.
"Price Leadership,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 143-62, January.
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Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988.
"Price Leadership,"
Discussion Papers
773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972.
"Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-22, February.
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