List Pricing And Pure Strategy Outcomes In A Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly
AbstractNon-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model is analyzed. The standard model is modified to include a list pricing stage and a subsequent price discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide to lower the price, or not, in a subsequent discounting stage. List pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces the pure strategy outcome. It is shown that for a general class of rationing rules there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that involves both firms playing pure strategies. This equilibrium payoff dominates any other sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, we show that the small firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we034918.
Date of creation: Oct 2003
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