Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care
AbstractA feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the coexistence of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis--vis the private provider, under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 170.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
negotiation; health care;
Other versions of this item:
- Xavier Martinez-Giralt & Barros Pedro Pita, 2005. "Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(5), pages 1-8.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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