The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations
AbstractWe develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conflict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the “weak” player in the conflict can strategically profit from the mediator’s quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07.05.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Mediation; Rubinstein bargaining.;
Other versions of this item:
- Camiña, Ester & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2009. "The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-92, January.
- CAMINA, Ester & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2004. "The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations," CORE Discussion Papers 2004005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995. "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 318.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, April.
- Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004.
"Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication,"
ESE Discussion Papers
75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 803-830, September.
- Jernej Copic & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Implementation by Decent Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000275, David K. Levine.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
- JÕzsef SÂkovics & Clara PonsatÎ, 1998. "Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 667-672.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2001. "Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 170-195, October.
- P. Manzini & C. Ponsati, 2006. "Stakeholder bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-77, April.
- Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publicación Digital - UPO).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.