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The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations

Author

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  • Ester Camiña

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II (Economía Cuantitativa). Universidad Complutense de Madrid.)

  • Nicolás Porteiro

    (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Abstract

We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conflict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the “weak” player in the conflict can strategically profit from the mediator’s quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one..

Suggested Citation

  • Ester Camiña & Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations," Working Papers 07.05, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:07.05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2017. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 365-387.
    2. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Daniel Montolio, 2014. "Bargaining in international conflicts resolution: UN involvement and conflict settlement," Chapters, in: Francesco Forte & Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra (ed.), A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 19, pages 443-471, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    4. Felix Haass & Nadine Ansorg, 2018. "Better peacekeepers, better protection? Troop quality of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(6), pages 742-758, November.
    5. Hanato, Shunsuke, 2019. "Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 361-379.
    6. Max Blouin, 2018. "Peacekeeping: A strategic approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 41-63, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mediation; Rubinstein bargaining.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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