Clara Ponsatí () (Institut d'Análisi Económica , 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain and CODE Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Department of Economics, University of Edinburgh, William Robertson Building, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK) József Sákovics () (Institut d'Análisi Económica , 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain and CODE Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Department of Economics, University of Edinburgh, William Robertson Building, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK)
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We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements. Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations, in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist. In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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