Opting out: bazaars versus "hi tech" markets
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.
Volume (Year): 18 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
Web page: http://www.fundacionsepi.es/
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985.
"Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining,"
Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September.
- Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
- Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
- Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 753-70, November.
- Mercedes Adamuz, 2005. "Opting Out in a War of Attrition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(49), pages 1-6.
- May, Frank Christian & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Centralized Bargaining in Press Wholesale," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79984, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Mitsutoshi M. Adachi, 1998. "A note on frictions in the Bazaar type bargaining game," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(2), pages 293-304, May.
- María Mercedes Adamuz & Clara Ponsatí, 2009.
"Arbitration systems and negotiations,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 279-303, September.
- Gans, Joshua, 1968- & Stern, Scott, 1969-, 1998.
"Incumbency and R&D incentives : licensing the gale of creative distruction,"
WP 4008-98., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Joshua S. Cans & Scott Stern, 2000. "Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 485-511, December.
- Rong, Kang, 2012. "Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 596-610.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:49:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2003. "A decentralized market with trading links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-103, February.
- Charles J. Thomas, 2012. "An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 12-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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