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Centralized Bargaining in Press Wholesale

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  • May, Frank Christian
  • Münster, Johannes

Abstract

This paper studies the institutional design of newspaper and periodical wholesale. Motivated by recent developments in Germany, we compare the efficiency properties of two alternative regimes for determining the wholesale margins: collective bargaining (as practised in Germany for the last decades) on the one hand, and local bargaining (as customary in the UK and lately aspired by some German publishers) on the other. We point out several advantages of centralized bargaining: While, in the short run, local bargaining appears more attractive to publishers, it may lead to higher prices for readers and, in the long run, higher total costs of delivery.

Suggested Citation

  • May, Frank Christian & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Centralized Bargaining in Press Wholesale," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79984, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79984
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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