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Union structure and firms incentives for cooperative R&D investments

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  • Constantine Manasakis

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

  • Emmanuel Petrakis

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

Abstract

We examine how different unionisation structures and the spillovers of R&D activities affect R&D investments and firms’ incentives to form a Research Joint Venture. We find that whenever firms invest non-cooperatively, an industry union increases R&D investments, if industry specific spillovers are low. In case of a Research Joint Venture, investments are always higher under firm-level unions. We also find that firms’ incentives to form a Research Joint Venture are stronger when they face an industry union, if spillovers are low. Rigidities in the labour market, such as high unemployment benefits or/and a central union, have negative effects on employment, output and profits and hinder the diffusion of the efficiency created by a RJV to consumers and employees. Integrated labour market and R&D policies are also discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0508.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 00 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0508

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Keywords: Trade Unions; Oligopoly; Process Innovations;

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References

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  1. Robert J. Flanagan, 1999. "Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1150-1175, September.
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  3. Claudio Piga & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2003. "Endogenous R&D Spillovers and Locational Choice," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0310, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
  4. MAULEON, Ana & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, José & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 2004. "R&D networks among unionized firms," CORE Discussion Papers 2004071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  7. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 1998. "Labour markets, bargaining and innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 931-939, May.
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  9. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 1999. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 253-262, November.
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  14. Hagedoorn, John & Link, Albert N. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2000. "Research partnerships1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 567-586, April.
  15. Frantzen, Dirk, 2000. "Innovation, International Technological Diffusion and the Changing Influence of R&D on Productivity," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 193-210, March.
  16. Hirsch, Barry, 2003. "What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?," IZA Discussion Papers 892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Cited by:
  1. Asproudis, Elias, 2011. "Trade union structure with environmental concern and firms' technological choice," MPRA Paper 28767, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Falvey, Rod & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri, 2013. "Coordination costs and research joint ventures," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 965-976.
  3. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2014. "Capacity Choice and Welfare under Alternative Unionisation Structures," Working Paper Series 12_14, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  4. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2013. "Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of a trade cost reduction in a unionised industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 30-33.

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