Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives

Contents:

Author Info

  • Justus Haucap
  • Christian Wey

Abstract

This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) "Decentralisation" where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) "coordination" where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms, and (3) "centralisation" where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under "centralisation" investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: "Decentralisation" carries higher investment incentives than "coordination". Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.41209.de/dp398.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 398.

as in new window
Length: 28 p.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp398

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin
Phone: xx49-30-89789-0
Fax: xx49-30-89789-200
Email:
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Agell, J., 1998. "On the Benefits from Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and Social Insurance," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series 1998:17, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  2. Moene, Karl Ove & Wallerstein, Michael, 1997. "Pay Inequality," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 403-30, July.
  3. Rowthorn, R E, 1992. "Centralisation, Employment and Wage Dispersion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(412), pages 506-23, May.
  4. Agell, Jonas & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1993. " Egalitarianism and Growth," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 559-79, December.
  5. Addison, John T & Hirsch, Barry T, 1989. "Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(1), pages 72-105, January.
  6. Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1993. "The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 519-534.
  7. Haucap, Justus & Pauly, Uwe & Wey, Christian, 2001. "Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-307, September.
  8. Robert J. Flanagan, 1999. "Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1150-1175, September.
  9. Connolly, Robert A & Hirsch, Barry T & Hirschey, Mark, 1986. "Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market Value of the Firm," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(4), pages 567-77, November.
  10. Oswald, Andrew J, 1985. " The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 160-93.
  11. Haucap, Justus & Christian Wey, 2003. "Unionisation Structures and Firms' Incentives for Productivity Enhancing Investments," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society 102, Royal Economic Society.
  12. Freeman, Richard & Schettkat, Ronald, 2001. "Skill Compression, Wage Differentials, and Employment: Germany vs the US," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 582-603, July.
  13. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr & Locking, Hakan, 2000. "Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence for Sweden," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(4), pages 755-82, October.
  14. Menezes-Filho, Naercio & Van Reenen, John, 2003. "Unions and Innovation: A Survey of the Theory and Empirical Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 1998. "Labour markets, bargaining and innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 931-939, May.
  16. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-60, March.
  17. Ulph, A. M. & Ulph, D. T., 1994. "Labour markets and innovation: Ex-post bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 195-210, January.
  18. Charles W. Baird, 2000. "Unions and Antitrust," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, Transaction Publishers, vol. 21(4), pages 585-600, October.
  19. Van Reenen, John, 1994. "The Creation and Capture of Rents: Wages and Innovation in a Panel of UK Companies," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Tauman, Y & Weiss, Y, 1987. "Labor Unions and the Adoption of New Technology," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 477-501, October.
  21. Burda, Michael C & Funke, Michael, 1991. "German Trade Unions After Unification: Third Degree Wage Discriminating Monopolists?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 573, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Andrea Bassanini & Ekkehard Ernst, 2002. "Labour Market Institutions, Product Market Regulation, and Innovation: Cross-Country Evidence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 316, OECD Publishing.
  23. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1978. "Trade Unions in the Production Process," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 355-78, June.
  24. Menezes-Filho, Naercio & Ulph, David & Van Reenen, John, 1998. "The determination of R&D: Empirical evidence on the role of unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 919-930, May.
  25. Bronars, Stephen G & Deere, Donald R, 1993. "Unionization, Incomplete Contracting, and Capital Investment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(1), pages 117-32, January.
  26. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
  27. Soskice, David, 1990. "Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 36-61, Winter.
  28. Oswald, Andrew J & Turnbull, Peter J, 1985. "Pay and Employment Determination in Britain: What Are Labour," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 80-97, Summer.
  29. Kleinknecht, Alfred, 1998. "Is Labour Market Flexibility Harmful to Innovation?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 387-96, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.