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Political uncertainty and economic underdevelopment

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  • Jorge M.Streb

Abstract

Political instability has been emphasized as a major source of uncertainty in Latin America. However,arbitrariness, i.e. the lack of constraints on the government, can also be seen as a major source of uncertainty in developing countries. Two dimensions of political uncertainty are thus distinguished, instability and arbitrariness. Empirically, low polity persistence is used for political instability, and low political constraints are used for arbitrariness. Unlike the usual approach in the literature, I relate this specific measure of political uncertainty to income per capita, rather than growth. The reason to explore this link is that if uncertainty leads to high interest rates, both capital and income per capita should be low. The conjecture that steady state income is lower with high political uncertainty leads to focus on its two dimensions. The data indeed suggest a strong positive relationship of political certainty, i.e. the combination of political constraints and polity persistence, with

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge M.Streb, 2001. "Political uncertainty and economic underdevelopment," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 28(1 Year 20), pages 89-114, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:28:y:2001:i:1:p:89-114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Jorge M.Streb & Pablo F.Druck, 2007. "Economic development as a matter of political geography," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 34(1 Year 20), pages 5-20, June.
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    7. Jorge M. Streb, 1998. "Y, si no hay más remedio... Inflación , Desconfianza y la Desintegración del Sistema Financiero en Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 128, Universidad del CEMA.
    8. Carlos Alfredo Rodríguez, 2000. "Macroeconomic Policy Lessons from LDC's," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 3, pages 169-216, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mellati, Ali, 2008. "Uncertainty and investment in private sector: An analytical argument and a review of the economy of Iran," MPRA Paper 26655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jorge M.Streb & Pablo F.Druck, 2007. "Economic development as a matter of political geography," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 34(1 Year 20), pages 5-20, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political uncertainty; instability; arbitrariness; economic development; convergence hypothesis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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