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Por qué importan las instituciones políticas para el desempeño económico: incertidumbre política y subdesarrollo

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  • Jorge M. Streb

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  • Jorge M. Streb, 2000. "Por qué importan las instituciones políticas para el desempeño económico: incertidumbre política y subdesarrollo," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 168, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:168
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    1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    2. Carlos Rodriguez, 2001. "Macroeconomic Policies: Can We Transfer Lessons Across LDCs?," International Economic Association Series, in: Jacques Drèze (ed.), Advances in Macroeconomic Theory, chapter 15, pages 310-331, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Jorge C. Ávila, 1999. "El costo Económico de la Incertidumbre," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 143, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
    5. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    6. Ricardo Hausmann & Michael Gavin, 1996. "Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock Prone Region: The Policy Challenge for Latin America," Research Department Publications 4020, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    8. Jorge C. Ávila, 1998. "El Potencial Argentino de Crecimiento," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 132, Universidad del CEMA.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    10. Jorge M. Streb, 1998. "Y, si no hay más remedio... Inflación , Desconfianza y la Desintegración del Sistema Financiero en Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 128, Universidad del CEMA.
    11. Robert J. Barro & Paul Romer, 1993. "Economic Growth (1992)," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number barr93-1, May.
    12. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
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