On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
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Cited by:
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2018.
"On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 83-97, January.
- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2019. "On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency," MPRA Paper 91714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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