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Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods

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Author Info
Deb, Rajat
Razzolini, Laura

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 88 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 340-368
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:88:y:1999:i:2:p:340-368

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Sean Gailmard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods," Working Papers 0214, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak & Robert Dorsey, 2007. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 283-314, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Matthew O. Jackson & Antonio Nicolo, 2002. "The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences," Microeconomics 0211005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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