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Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project

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  • Deb, Rajat
  • Razzolini, Laura

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-3VGJJB6-2/2/f20b5bd36b0a8fadad312293d27fbcd4
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 123-138

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:2:p:123-138

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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References

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  1. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
  2. Gradstein, Mark, 1994. "Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 877-97, November.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1988. "Fundamentals of Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121271.
  6. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  7. Nitzan, Shmuel & Romano, Richard E., 1990. "Private provision of a discrete public good with uncertain cost," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 357-370, August.
  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicoloó & Tridib Sharma & Levent Ülkü, 2013. "On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good," Working Papers 1306, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  2. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 88-114, January.
  3. Yan Yu, 2007. "Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 539-555, October.
  4. Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.
  5. Ruben Juarez, 2012. "Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences," Working Papers 201202, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  6. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
  7. Juarez, Ruben, 2013. "Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 218-239.
  8. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Monopoly Sale of a Network Good," ISER Discussion Paper 0794, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  9. Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak & Robert Dorsey, 2004. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule," Working Papers 0402, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Ohseto, Shinji, 2000. "Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-66, July.
  11. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 300-308.
  12. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
  13. Rajat Deb & Laura Razzolini & Tae Seo, 2006. "The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 205-232, December.

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