Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination
AbstractThe game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists. Copyright Springer 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 57 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
Non-cooperative game; R&D cooperation; Trust and opportunism;
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