R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing?
AbstractUnder the Cross-Licensing system (CL), firms are allowed to trade non cooperatively the results of R&D efforts, and compete in the innovation and production stages. First, the paper proposes a simple modeling of this system. Second, a relevant comparison is made with the Cartelized Research Joint Venture (RJV), the form of R&D cooperation recognized to be the best one. We prove that the Cross-Licensing system may be socially better than the Cartelized RJV. In terms of antitrust policy, for firms, the most favorable collusion mode is Joint Exploitation. We prove that firms are equally tempted by this mode, whether they are under CL or under Cartelized RJV.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.
Volume (Year): 77 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm
Cross-Licensing; R&D cooperation; Cartelized Research Joint Venture; R&D spillovers; Efficiency; Antitrust policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Marie-Laure CABON-DHERSIN & Rim LAHMANDI-AYED, 2011. "R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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