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Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

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  • Anders Poulsen

    ()

  • Michael Roos

Abstract

Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 206-225

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:2:p:206-225

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: Strategic commitment; Commitment; Bargaining; Strategic value of information; Physical timing effects; Endogenous timing; Experiment; C72; C78; C90; C92; D63; D80;

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Cited by:
  1. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2010. "Endogenous Move Structure And Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: Theory And Experiment," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2013. "Choosing one's preferences," Working Papers hal-00864704, HAL.
  4. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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