Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
AbstractTwo-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on the observability assumption.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 233.
Date of creation: Mar 1996
Date of revision: Aug 1997
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Information acquisition; oligopoly; uncertainty; Bayesian equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, . "Secret information acquisition in cournot markets," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/6062, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-09-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1998-09-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1998-09-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1979. "The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 243-250, March.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1994. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 795-819, November.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1996.
"Information acquisition and entry,"
Economics Working Papers
155, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hwang, Hae-shin, 1995. "Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 325-40, May.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March.
- Li, Lode & McKelvey, Richard D. & Page, Talbot, 1987. "Optimal research for cournot oligopolists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 140-166, June.
- Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 851-76, July.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2008.
"Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries,"
CEDI Discussion Paper Series
08-03, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 249-271, June.
- Anders Poulsen & Michael Roos, 2010.
"Do People Make Strategic Commitments? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance,"
University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series
007, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Anders Poulsen & Michael Roos, 2010. "Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 206-225, June.
- Anders U. Poulsen & Michael W. M. Roos, 2009. "Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Sjaak Hurkens, 2012. "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in "Linear" Cournot Models with Private Information about Costs," Working Papers 674, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jansen, J.A., 1999. "Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race with Learning Labs," Discussion Paper 1999-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2003. "Endogenous Private Information Structures," Working Papers 38, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007.
"Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information,"
CSEF Working Papers
170, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007. "Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 07/167, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Kazunori Miwa, 2013. "The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Hurkens, Sjaak & Vulkan, Nir, 2006.
"Endogenous private information structures,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 35-54, January.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2000. "Endogenous Private Information Structures," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0613, Econometric Society.
- Eliane Catilina, 2002. "Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets: An (enhanced) two- Stage Approach," Game Theory and Information 0205005, EconWPA.
- Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November.
- Sjaak Hurkens, 2012. "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in ''Linear'' Cournot Models with Private Information About Cost," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 924.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1999. "Endogenous information structures," Economics Working Papers 386, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.