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Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game

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Author Info
Daughety, Andrew F
Reinganum, Jennifer F

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Abstract

The authors employ a static homogeneous-good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods. The model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behavior. Asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern: the informed (uninformed) firm chooses to assume the leader's (follower's) role. Moreover, if information is costly, the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information. Thus, identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially: this is the unique (refined) equilibrium outcome. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 35 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 795-819
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:35:y:1994:i:4:p:795-819

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  1. AMIR, Rabah & STEPANOVA, Anna, 2004. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," CORE Discussion Papers 2004037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Secret Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets," Economics Working Papers 233, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 1997. [Downloadable!]
  3. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pacheco de Almeida, Goncalo & Zemsky, Peter, 2002. "Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 3674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997. "On the unique d1 equilibrium in the Stackelberg model with asymmetric information," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1995. "Capacity Commitment Versus Flexibility: The Technological Choice Nexus in a Strategic Context," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hans-Theo Normann, 1997. "Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 177-187, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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