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Endogenous Private Information Structures

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  • Sjaak Hurkens
  • Nir Vulkan

Abstract

We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when "Nash" is replaced by "sequential". We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 38.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:38

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Keywords: Information acquisition; private information; equilibrium;

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References

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  1. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 851-76, July.
  2. Hurkens, Sjaak & Vulkan, Nir, 2001. "Information acquisition and entry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 467-479, April.
  3. Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997. "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 97-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  4. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  5. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1994. "Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 675-682, April.
  6. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
  7. Tom K. Lee, 1982. "Resource Information Policy and Federal Resource Leasing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 561-568, Autumn.
  8. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  9. Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
  10. Li, Lode & McKelvey, Richard D. & Page, Talbot, 1987. "Optimal research for cournot oligopolists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 140-166, June.
  11. Hwang, Hae-shin, 1995. "Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 325-40, May.
  12. Hurkens, Sjaak & Vulkan, Nir, 2003. "Free entry does not imply zero profits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 285-290, December.
  13. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
  14. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 233, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 1997.
  15. Hwang Hae-shin, 1993. "Optimal Information Acquisition for Heterogenous Duopoly Firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 385-402, April.
  16. Anke Kessler, 1998. "The Value of Ignorance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 339-354, Summer.
  17. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1979. "The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 243-250, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Anders Poulsen & Michael Roos, 2010. "Do People Make Strategic Commitments? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 007, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  2. Anders U. Poulsen & Michael V. M. Roos, 2009. "Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 09-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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