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Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance

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  • Anders U. Poulsen

    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

  • Michael V. M. Roos

    (Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Abstract

The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player can make a strategic move of committing to not seeing what another player will demand. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the predicted strategic move. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 09-06.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0906

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Related research

Keywords: strategic moves; commitment; bargaining; strategic value of information; physical timing effects; endogenous timing; experiment;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2011. "Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 6087, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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