Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance
AbstractThe strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player can make a strategic move of committing to not seeing what another player will demand. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the predicted strategic move. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 09-06.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
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strategic moves; commitment; bargaining; strategic value of information; physical timing effects; endogenous timing; experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-04-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2009-04-13 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-EXP-2009-04-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-04-13 (Game Theory)
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- Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2011. "Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 6087, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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