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Resource Information Policy and Federal Resource Leasing

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Author Info
Tom K. Lee
Abstract

An important observation in recent studies of federal resource information policy is that there may be overinvestment in acquiring resource information by the private sector in federal resource leasing. One policy conclusion is that the federal government should provide information about the resource being leased. This article provides conditions under which it pays the government to provide resource information. It also briefly evaluates a policy alternative, namely, the use of a contingent reservation bid scheme to solve the problem of overinvestment in resource information.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 561-568
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:autumn:p:561-568

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  1. Juan Carlos Barcena-ruiz & Jesus Rubio, 2000. "Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 58, pages 08, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1999. "Endogenous Information Structures," Economics Working Papers 386, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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