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On the commitment value of contracts under renegotiation constraints

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Author Info
BENSAID, B.
GARY-BOBO, J.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1991002.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1991
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1991002

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  1. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2009. "Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0908, TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]
  4. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2008. "Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts," TÜSÄ°AD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0803., TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]
  6. Anders U. Poulsen & Michael V. M. Roos, 2009. "Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," Discussion Papers 09-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Levent Koçkesen, 2007. "Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 539-552, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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