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Division of a contest with identical prizes

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  • Ando, Munetomo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.

Volume (Year): 18 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 282-297

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:18:y:2004:i:2:p:282-297

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903

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References

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  1. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
  2. Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Educational Production," NBER Working Papers 7349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
  4. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
  5. Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman, 2001. "Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 711-744.
  6. Becker, William E. & Rosen, Sherwin, 1992. "The learning effect of assessment and evaluation in high school," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 107-118, June.
  7. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2000. "The Effects Of Class Size On Student Achievement: New Evidence From Population Variation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1239-1285, November.
  8. Wo[ss]mann, Ludger & West, Martin, 2006. "Class-size effects in school systems around the world: Evidence from between-grade variation in TIMSS," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 695-736, April.
  9. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Betts, Julian R, 1998. "The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 266-75, March.
  11. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
  12. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
  13. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
  14. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Munetomo Ando, 2004. "Overconfidence in Economic Contests," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, Econometric Society 708, Econometric Society.
  2. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.

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