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Trust and Truth

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Author Info

  • Tore Ellingsen
  • Magnus Johannesson
  • Jannie Lilja
  • Henrik Zetterqvist

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma bid more aggressively if their opponent defected. Cooperators also lie more about their valuations when their opponent defected. The results constitute novel evidence that many people are strong reciprocators. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02212.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 534 (01)
Pages: 252-276

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:534:p:252-276

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Cited by:
  1. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2011. "Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Paper Series 883, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "More Communication, Less Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 24 Nov 2010.
  3. López-Pérez, Raúl, 2009. "The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
  4. Rosaz, Julie & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 5884, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Galanis, Spyros & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2014. "Concern for relative standing and deception," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1403, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  6. Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rilke, Rainer Michael & Walkowitz, Gari, 2011. "Lying and Team Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 5968, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 642-658.
  8. Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 321-344.

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