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A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri‐Environmental Policy

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  • C. Choe
  • I. Fraser

Abstract

In this note the impact of imperfect compliance monitoring on the implementation of agri‐environmental policy is analysed. A principal‐agent model is used to demonstrate how imperfections in the monitoring process lead to higher levels of incentive payments to ensure compliance. This means that less accurate compliance monitoring results in higher social costs from policy implementation. Technical enhancements in the accuracy of compliance monitoring will therefore lead to a reduction in social costs. This is an important result with significant implications for the design and implementation of agri‐environmental policy.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jageco:v:49:y:1998:i:2:p:250-258
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1998.tb01267.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. De Pin, Antonio, 2006. "L’attuazione delle misure paesaggistiche nella politica di sviluppo rurale del Veneto [The implementation of landscape measures in Veneto's rural development policy]," MPRA Paper 82587, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2006.
    2. Rousseau Sandra, 2008. "Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0801, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    3. Kentaro Kawasaki & Takeshi Fujie & Kentaro Koito & Norikazu Inoue & Hiroki Sasaki, 2012. "Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 157-179, June.
    4. Lankoski, Jussi E. & Lichtenberg, Erik & Ollikainen, Markku, 2008. "Agri-environmental program compliance under heterogeneous conditions," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44381, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487, September.
    6. Rob Fraser, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri‐environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 475-487, November.
    7. Ozanne, Adam & White, Benedict, 2008. "Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(2), pages 1-10.
    8. Bartolini, Fabio & Gallerani, Vittorio & Raggi, Meri & Viaggi, Davide, 2008. "Modelling The Effectiveness Of Cross-Compliance Under Asymmetric Information," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6670, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    9. Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
    10. Bazzani, Guido Maria & Viaggi, Davide, 2004. "Improving the design of agri-environmental policies: a case study in Italy," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(2), pages 1-15, August.
    11. Johst, Karin & Drechsler, Martin & Watzold, Frank, 2002. "An ecological-economic modelling procedure to design compensation payments for the efficient spatio-temporal allocation of species protection measures," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 37-49, April.
    12. Alban Lika & Francesco Galioto & Davide Viaggi, 2017. "Water Authorities’ Pricing Strategies to Recover Supply Costs in the Absence of Water Metering for Irrigated Agriculture," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(12), pages 1-16, November.
    13. Yuki Yano & David Blandford, 2009. "Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri‐environmental Schemes," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 530-545, September.
    14. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, 2008. "Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy," 82nd Annual Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2008, Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester, UK 36873, Agricultural Economics Society.
    15. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
    16. Bartolini, Fabio & Gallerani, Vittorio & Raggi, Meri & Viaggi, Davide, 2005. "Contract Design and Targeting for the Production of Public Goods in Agriculture: The Impact of the 2003 Cap Reform," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24559, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

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