Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 52 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Agri-environmental policies; Auction; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Laboratory experiment; Monitoring; C91—Laboratory; Individual Behavior; D44—Auctions; Q28—Government Policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Pol - Economic Systems - - - - -
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.