Enforcement aspects of conservation policies: compensation payments versus reserves
AbstractThis model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces0806.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
monitoring and enforcement; policy instruments; conservation policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Rousseau, Sandra, 2008. "Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44453, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Rousseau Sandra, 2008. "Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0801, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2008-03-25 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-03-25 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Konstantinos Giannakas & Jonathan D. Kaplan, 2005. "Policy Design and Conservation Compliance on Highly Erodible Lands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1).
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999.
"Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy,"
Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1997. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Working Papers 1997.08, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258.
- Gibson, Clark C. & Williams, John T. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2005. "Local Enforcement and Better Forests," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-284, February.
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