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Policy Design and Conservation Compliance on Highly Erodible Lands

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  • Konstantinos Giannakas
  • Jonathan D. Kaplan

Abstract

We develop a game-theoretic model of heterogeneous producers in order to identify the economic determinants of producer noncompliance with the conservation provisions of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) policy on highly erodible lands. We evaluate the policy effectiveness in inducing compliance and adoption of conservation practices. The current policy design creates economic incentives for all noncompliant producers to masquerade as adopters and to claim government payments for which they are not entitled. Both theoretical and empirical results indicate that the increased income transfers to agriculture enacted under the latest Farm Bill will increase producer compliance and conservation activity on highly erodible lands.

Suggested Citation

  • Konstantinos Giannakas & Jonathan D. Kaplan, 2005. "Policy Design and Conservation Compliance on Highly Erodible Lands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:81:y:2005:i:1:p20-33
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    Cited by:

    1. Pathak, Santosh & Wang, Hua & Adusumilli, Naveen C., 2022. "Contract Non-compliance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Cost-share Programs in Louisiana, USA," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322324, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Claassen, Roger & Bowman, Maria & Breneman, Vince & Wade, Tara & Williams, Ryan & Fooks, Jacob & Hansen, LeRoy & Iovanna, Rich & Loesch, Chuck, 2017. "Conservation Compliance: How Farmer Incentives Are Changing in the Crop Insurance Era," Economic Research Report 261814, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    3. Wade, Tara & Kurkalova, Lyubov & Secchi, Silvia, 2016. "Modeling Field-Level Conservation Tillage Adoption with Aggregate Choice Data," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 41(2), May.
    4. Cross, Robin M. & Buccola, Steven T. & Thomann, Enrique A., 2006. "Cooperation and Cheating," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21158, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Schleyer, Christian & Theesfeld, Insa & Hagedorn, Konrad & Aznar, Olivier & Callois, Jean-Marc & Verburg, Rene & Yelkouni, Martin & Olsson, Johanna Alkan, 2007. "Approach towards an operational tool to apply institutional analysis for the assessment of policy feasibility within SEAMLESS-IF," Reports 9295, Wageningen University, SEAMLESS: System for Environmental and Agricultural Modelling; Linking European Science and Society.
    6. Sandra Rousseau, 2008. "Enforcement aspects of conservation policies: compensation payments versus reserves," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0806, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    7. Doering, Otto & Smith, Katherine R., 2012. "Examining the Relationship of Conservation Compliance and Farm Program Incentives," C-FARE Reports 156624, Council on Food, Agricultural, and Resource Economics (C-FARE).
    8. Author-Name: Luca Di Corato & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2014. "Bidding for Conservation Contracts," Working Papers 2014.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2018. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: The case of conservation contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(1), pages 368-380.
    10. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    11. Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2015. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions," Working Paper Series 2015:6, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
    12. Fulton, Murray E. & Mihal, Daniela, 2005. "The Economic Impact of Non-Compliance in the Carbon-Offset Market," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19179, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
    14. Czap, Natalia V. & Czap, Hans J. & Lynne, Gary D. & Burbach, Mark E., 2015. "Walk in my shoes: Nudging for empathy conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 147-158.
    15. Ribaudo, Marc & Savage, Jeffrey, 2014. "Controlling non-additional credits from nutrient management in water quality trading programs through eligibility baseline stringency," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 233-239.
    16. Zilberman, David & Segerson, Kathleen, 2012. "Top Ten Design Elements to Achieve More Efficient Conservation Programs," C-FARE Reports 156623, Council on Food, Agricultural, and Resource Economics (C-FARE).
    17. Kingston, Suzanne & Wang, Zizhen, 2023. "How do nature governance rules affect compliance decisions? An experimental analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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