Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves
AbstractThis model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behaviour to change over time. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium with number 44453.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Monitoring and enforcement; Policy instruments; Conservation policy; Environmental Economics and Policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Sandra Rousseau, 2008. "Enforcement aspects of conservation policies: compensation payments versus reserves," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0806, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Rousseau Sandra, 2008. "Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0801, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2008-11-25 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-11-25 (Regulation)
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- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1997.
"Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy,"
1997.08, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487.
- C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258.
- Gibson, Clark C. & Williams, John T. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2005. "Local Enforcement and Better Forests," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-284, February.
- Konstantinos Giannakas & Jonathan D. Kaplan, 2005. "Policy Design and Conservation Compliance on Highly Erodible Lands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1).
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