This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments versus Reserves

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rousseau, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behaviour to change over time. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44453
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium with number 44453.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae08:44453

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.eaae.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (AgEcon Search).

Related research
Keywords: Monitoring and enforcement; Policy instruments; Conservation policy; Environmental Economics and Policy;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Konstantinos Giannakas & Jonathan D. Kaplan, 2005. "Policy Design and Conservation Compliance on Highly Erodible Lands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1). [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Choe, C. & Fraser, I., 1997. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Papers 97.08, La Trobe - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.