Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy
AbstractThis paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1997.08.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Information; Environmental Management;
Other versions of this item:
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487.
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