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The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Arnott, Richard J
Stiglitz, Joseph E

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Abstract

The basic analytics of moral hazard are developed using the simples t possible model of the insurance market. Even when the underlying expe cted utility function and the function relating the accident probability to accident-prevention effort are extremely well behaved, the indifference curves and feasibility set (the set of insurance contracts that at least break even) are not-indifference curves need not be convex and feasibility sets never are; price-and income-consum ption lines may be discontinuous; and effort is not, in general, a monotonic or continuous function of the parameters of the insurance policies provided. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 383-413
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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:3:p:383-413

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Dysfunctional Non-Market Institutions and the Market," NBER Working Papers 2666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000748, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alan Krueger, 1988. "Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation," Working Papers 619, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giacomo Pasini & Giovanni Millo, 2006. "Does Social Capital reduce moral hazard? A network model for non-life insurance demand," Working Papers 2006_59, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bems, Rudolfs & Jönsson, Kristian, 2002. "Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets and the Optimal Bailout Policy," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 520, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 31 Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen, 2007. "Family ties, incentives and development: a model of coerced altruism," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 681, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hans H. Glismann & Klaus Schrader, 2001. "Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Kiel Working Papers 1052, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen, 2007. "The Fetters of the Sib: Weber Meets Darwin," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 682, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Louis Kaplow, 1993. "Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action," NBER Working Papers 3006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Smith, Vincent H. & Chouinard, Hayley H. & Baquet, Alan E., 1994. "Almost Ideal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contracts," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 23(1), April. [Downloadable!]
  13. Richard Arnott & Chong-en Bai & Brian Sack, 1996. "Latent Policies: An Extended Example," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 353., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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