Game Theory For Playing Games: Sophistication In A Negative-Externality Experiment
Abstract"We explore the extent to which the lack of Nash payoff maximization in experimental games is attributable to the "sophistication" of participants (i.e., their understanding of strategic decision making and profit-maximizing decisions). To this end, we compare the behaviors of sophisticated participants (i.e., those who have been exposed to the concepts of game theory) against those of a more standard subject pool in a moral hazard environment. Results suggest that sophisticated subjects are significantly more likely to adopt strategies predicted by standard theory and arrive at a Nash equilibrium. "("JEL "C72, C91, C92, D63, D64) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 47 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 18830 Brookhurst Street, Suite 304, Fountain Valley, CA 92708 USA
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0095-2583
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Robert Oxoby, 2013. "Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 125-138, June.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Empowering neighbors versus imposing regulations: An experimental analysis of pollution reduction schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 469-484.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.