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Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy

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  • Potters, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 43 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 499-522

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:4:p:499-522

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References

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  1. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  2. Anderson, M.J. & Sunder, S., 1989. "Professional Traders As Intuitive Bayesians," GSIA Working Papers 88-89-51, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  3. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Dyer, D. & Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "A Comparison Of Naive And Experienced Bidders In Common Value Offer Auctions A Laboratory Analysis," Papers 11, Houston - Department of Economics.
  6. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-91, December.
  7. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
  8. Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F. van, 1995. "Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study," Discussion Paper 1995-126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
  10. Douglas Dyer & John Kagel, 1996. "Bidding in common value auctions: How the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse," Framed Field Experiments 00144, The Field Experiments Website.
  11. Douglas DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Wilfred Uecker, 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Artefactual Field Experiments 00039, The Field Experiments Website.
  12. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  13. repec:feb:framed:00135 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1998-02, McMaster University.
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Cited by:
  1. Goodwin, Paul, 2002. "Forecasting games: can game theory win?," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 369-374.
  2. Großer, Jens & Reuben, Ernesto, 2009. "Redistributive Politics and Market Efficiency: An Experimental Study," IZA Discussion Papers 4549, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Enrique Fatás & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2004. "How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/58, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  4. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2005.
  5. David Cooper, 2006. "Are experienced managers experts at overcoming coordination failure?," Artefactual Field Experiments 00037, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002. "Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2011. "Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1580-1589, July.
  8. Hopfensitz, Astrid & Wranik, Tanja, 2009. "How to Adapt to Changing Markets: Experience and Personality in a Repeated Investment Game," TSE Working Papers 09-122, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  9. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
  10. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0404003, EconWPA, revised 27 Oct 2004.
  11. Pikulina, E.S. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Horst, J.R. ter & Tobler, P.N., 2013. "Overconfidence, Effort, and Investment," Discussion Paper 2013-035, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M., 2000. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Affect Consumers Prices? An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper 2000-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  13. Enrique Fatás & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2004. "How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment," IESA Working Papers Series 0410, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
  14. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2010. "A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2624-2633, October.
  15. Edward J. Lopez & W. Robert Nelson, 2005. "The Endowment Effect in a Public Good Experiment," Experimental 0512001, EconWPA.

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