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Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents

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  • Spraggon, John

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 837-856

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:837-856

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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  1. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January.
  2. Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
  3. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
  4. Willinger, Marc & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-328, December.
  5. John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics, EconWPA 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994.
  6. Weimann, Joachim, 1994. "Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 185-200, June.
  7. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21, February.
  8. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June.
  9. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
  10. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
  11. Rapoport, Amnon & Suleiman, Ramzi, 1993. "Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 171-194, July.
  12. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995. "Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March.
  13. Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September.
  14. Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 1997. "Equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 349-364, March.
  15. Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E, 1997. "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 829-46, December.
  16. Kenneth Chan & Stuart Mestelman & Robert Moir & R. Muller, 1999. "Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, August.
  17. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
  18. Alfons Weersink & John R. Livernois & Jason F. Shogren & James S. Shortle, 1998. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Agriculture," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 309-327, September.
  19. Cadsby, Charles Bram & Maynes, Elizabeth, 1999. "Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 53-73, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Collins, Alan R. & Maille, Peter, 2011. "Group decision-making theory and behavior under performance-based water quality payments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 806-812, February.
  2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
  3. François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, 04.
  4. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2011. "The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 355-373, October.
  5. Francois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Kene Boun My, 2005. "The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory: A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2005-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  6. Francois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Kene Boun My, 2004. "Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions under Limited Information: A Stress Experimental Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2003-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  7. Suter, Jordan F. & Poe, Gregory L. & Vossler, Christian A., 2005. "Beyond Optimal Linear Tax Mechanisms: An Experimental Examination of Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Polluters," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 19411, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  8. James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2013. "Policy Instruments for Water Quality Protection," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 111-138, June.
  9. Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L. & Schulze, William D. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2006. "An Experimental Exploration of a Voluntary Mechanism to Reduce Nonpoint Source Water Pollution with a Background Threat of Regulation," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 21416, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  10. Jordan F. Suter & Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(1), pages 86-102.
  11. Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L., 2009. "Ambient-based pollution mechanisms: A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1883-1892, April.
  12. Ghosh, Gaurav & Kwasnica, Anthony & Shortle, James, 2010. "A Laboratory Experiment to Compare Two Market Institutions for Emissions Trading," FCN Working Papers, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN) 18/2010, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN).
  13. Nasreddine AMMAR & Ahmed ENNASRI & Marc Willinger, 2011. "Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 11-25, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2011.
  14. Kene Boun My & Francois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2007. "On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2007-081, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  15. Ali, M. & Le Grusse, P. & Rio, Patrick, 2008. "Tradable Permits Under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium, European Association of Agricultural Economists 44414, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  16. Mourad Ali & Patrick Rio, 2009. "Tradable Permits under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 09-21, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
  17. Vossler, Christian A. & Suter, Jordan F. & Poe, Gregory L., 2013. "Experimental evidence on dynamic pollution tax policies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 101-115.
  18. Jordan F. Suter & Kathleen Segerson & Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe, 2010. "Voluntary-Threat Approaches to Reduce Ambient Water Pollution," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1195-1213.

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