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Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods

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Author Info
Bagnoli, Mark
McKee, Michael

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Abstract

This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate a mechanism for the voluntary provision of public good. The public good is provided if the total contributions meet or exceed a threshold and all contributions are returned if the public good is not provided. The members of the group all know the threshold, the incomes, and the valuations assigned the public good by all other members. The results support the prediction that this mechanism will yield Pareto efficient outcomes and suggest that economic agents adopt strategies which form equilibria satisfying certain refinements to the Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 351-66
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:2:p:351-66

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  1. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Working Papers 0008, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kenneth Chan & Stuart Mestelman & Robert Moir & R. Muller, 1999. "Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Lucca Corazzini & Marco Faravelli & Lucca Stanca, 2007. "A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms," ESE Discussion Papers 159, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John Spraggon, 2003. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 2003-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
  7. James Andreoni, 2006. "Giving Gifts to Groups: How Congestible is Altruism?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Josef Falkinger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence," IEW - Working Papers iewwp003, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Robin Boadway & Zhen Song & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2006. "Commitment and Matching Contributions to Public Goods," Working Papers 1067, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2003. "Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-wide Targets," Working papers 2004-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gregory Poe & Jeremy Clark & Daniel Rondeau & William Schulze, 2002. "Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 105-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Bruno Broseta, 2001. "Asset Markets And Equilibrium Selection In Public Goods Games With Provision Points: An Experimental Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-29, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  13. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  15. K. S. Chan & S. Mestelman & R. Moir & R. A. Muller, 2001. "Heterogeneity, Communication, Coordination and Voluntary Provision of a Public Good," Department of Economics Working Papers 2001-06, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Henrik Orzen, 2005. "Fundraising through Competition: Evidence from the Lab," Discussion Papers 2005-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  17. Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August. [Downloadable!]
  18. Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2004. "Using Tontines to Finance Public Goods: Back to the Future?," NBER Working Papers 10958, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Within-Team Competition in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Experimental 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2004. "Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 0418, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 27 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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