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Empowering neighbors versus imposing regulations: An experimental analysis of pollution reduction schemes

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  • Cason, Timothy N.
  • Gangadharan, Lata

Abstract

This paper presents an experimental study of two mechanisms that influence incentives to reduce ambient pollution levels. In the formal mechanism individuals face a penalty if the group generates total pollution that exceeds a specified target, whereas in the informal mechanism individuals can choose to incur costs to punish each other after observing their group members' emissions. We examine the effectiveness of these mechanisms, in isolation and in combination. The results suggest that the formal targeting mechanism is significantly more effective than informal peer punishment in reducing pollution and increasing efficiency. Peer punishment however improves the performance of the formal mechanism.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 469-484

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:469-484

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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Keywords: Ambient target; Non-point source pollution; Peer-punishment; Transfer coefficients;

References

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Cited by:
  1. James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2013. "Policy Instruments for Water Quality Protection," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 111-138, June.

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