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Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

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  • Marco Casari

    ()

  • Luigi Luini

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-011-9292-6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 241-259

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:2:p:241-259

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: Experiments; Sanctions; Public goods; Strategic behavior; Social norms; C91; C92; D23;

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References

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  1. Vyrastekova, J. & Funaki, Y. & Takeuchi, A., 2008. "Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning," Discussion Paper 2008-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 358-369, December.
  3. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
  4. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin Kocher, . "Choosing the carrot or the stick? ? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations," Working Papers 2008-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  5. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
  6. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2005. "Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 2017-2030, November.
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. James Andreoni & William T. harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-01, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2002.
  9. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
  10. Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005.
  11. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  12. Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Simon Gaechter, 2014. "Human Pro-Social Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order," CESifo Working Paper Series 4729, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2012. "Is altruism bad for cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 330-341.
  3. Choi, Jung-Kyoo & Ahn, T.K., 2013. "Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 17-30.
  4. Patel, Amrish & Cartwright, Edward & Mark, Van Vugt, 2010. "Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity," Working Papers in Economics 451, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  5. Peter Duersch & Julia M�ller, 2013. "Taking Punishment into Your Own Hands: An Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-071/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Peter Duersch & Julia M�ller, 2013. "Taking Punishment into Your Own Hands: An Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-071/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Empowering neighbors versus imposing regulations: An experimental analysis of pollution reduction schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 469-484.
  8. Simon Gächter, 2014. "Human Pro-Social Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order," Discussion Papers 2014-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  9. J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara, 2011. "An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Welfarism," CESifo Working Paper Series 3318, CESifo Group Munich.

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