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A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Nikos Nikiforakis () (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London )
Hans-Theo Normann () (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London )
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This paper provides a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary systematically the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income, and we find that contributions to the public good increase monotonically in effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete contribution rates and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation found in the public-good game without punishment. In these cases, the possibility to punish may even worsen welfare. Finally, we show that punishment is a normal and inferior good.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number
05/07.
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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004.
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Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002.
"The Demand for Punishment ,"
Middlebury College Working Paper Series
0243, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2005.
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Other versions: Peter Duersch & Maros Servátka, 2007.
"Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s Dilemma ,"
Working Papers
0451, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2007.
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Michele Bernasconi, Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal., 2007.
"Two are Better Than One! Individuals' Contributions to "Unpacked" Public Goods ,"
ISLA Working Papers
30, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
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Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006.
"Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods ,"
Working Papers in Economics
219, Göteborg University, Department of Economics.
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Kosfeld Michael & Okada Akira & Riedl Arno, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
Research Memoranda
029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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Other versions: Haigner, Stefan & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2006.
"Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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