Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Social Identity and Punishment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jeffrey V. Butler

    (EIEF)

  • Pierluigi Conzo

    (University of Turin)

  • Martin A. Leroch

    (University of Mainz)

Abstract

Third party punishment is crucial for sustaining cooperative behavior. Still, little is known about its determinants. In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate a long-conjectured interaction between group identification and bystanders' punishment preferences using a novel measure of these preferences. We induce minimal groups and give a bystander the opportunity to punish the perpetrator of an unfair act against a defenseless victim. We elicit the bystander's valuation for punishment in four cases - when the perpetrator, the victim, both or neither are members of the bystander's group. We generate testable predictions about the rank order of punishment valuations from a simple framework incorporating group-contingent preferences for justice which are largely confirmed. Finally, we conduct control sessions where groups are not induced. Comparing punishment across treatment and control suggests that third-party punishers tend to treat others as in-group members unless otherwise divided.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.eief.it/files/2013/05/wp-16-social-identity-and-punishment.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) in its series EIEF Working Papers Series with number 1316.

as in new window
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision: May 2013
Handle: RePEc:eie:wpaper:1316

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Sallustiana, 62 - 00187 Roma
Phone: +39 066790013
Fax: +39 0647924872
Email:
Web page: http://www.eief.it/repec
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2010. "Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 239-258, June.
  2. Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi & Ploner, Matteo, 2013. "Group membership, team preferences, and expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 183-190.
  3. Roy Chen & Yan Chen, 2011. "The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2562-89, October.
  4. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
  5. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 212-216, May.
  6. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2005. "Managing diversity by creating team identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 371-392, November.
  7. Lewisch Peter & Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio, 2010. "Free-riding on altruistic punishment? An experimental comparison of third-party-punishment in a stand-alone and in an in-group environment," POLIS Working Papers, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS 139, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  8. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2012. "The Impact of Social Ties on Group Interactions: Evidence from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 101-15, February.
  9. Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
  10. Hugh Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A, 2011. "Reciprocity towards Groups," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) 52, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Identity & punishment
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2013-07-23 14:03:05

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eie:wpaper:1316. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Facundo Piguillem).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.