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Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment

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Author Info
Casari, Marco
Luini, Luigi

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Abstract

This paper experimentally studies peer punishment under three alternative technologies. We find that the choice of peer punishment technology has a substantial impact on group performance. First, under technology where at least two subjects in the group must agree before another group member can be punished, group cooperation and group net earnings are the highest. Second, outcomes are similar regardless of whether punishment choices are simultaneously or sequential. These results suggest that punishment is not perceived as a second-order public good but is instead an emotional reaction unresponsive to changes in the strategic environment.

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File URL: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd/Working-paper-series/Year-2005/1176.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1176.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1176

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Related research
Keywords: decentralized punishment ; public goods ; other-regarding preferences ; team production ; experiments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Experimental 0403001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: The Effects of Residual Claimancy and Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-074e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000060, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Josef Falkinger et al., 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March. [Downloadable!]
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  10. James Andreoni & William T. harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-01, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers iewwp059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  13. Oliver Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2002. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers 2002-29, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Casari, Marco & Luini, Luigi, 2006. "Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1188, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2008. "Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1036, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  3. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin Kocher, . "Choosing the carrot or the stick? – Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations," Working Papers 2008-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  4. Annamaria Nese & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2009. "Individuals' Voting Choice and Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 025, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  5. Haigner, Stefan & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2006. "Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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