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Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Casari, Marco
Luini, Luigi
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This paper experimentally studies peer punishment under three alternative technologies. We find that the choice of peer punishment technology has a substantial impact on group performance. First, under technology where at least two subjects in the group must agree before another group member can be punished, group cooperation and group net earnings are the highest. Second, outcomes are similar regardless of whether punishment choices are simultaneously or sequential. These results suggest that punishment is not perceived as a second-order public good but is instead an emotional reaction unresponsive to changes in the strategic environment.
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Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number
1176.
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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: May 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1176Contact details of provider: Postal: Krannert Building, West Lafayette, IN 47907 Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paul S. Chun).
Keywords: decentralized punishment public goods other-regarding preferences team production experiments Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin Kocher, .
"Choosing the carrot or the stick? – Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations ,"
Working Papers
2008-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
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Casari, Marco & Luini, Luigi, 2006.
"Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice? ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1188, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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Haigner, Stefan & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2006.
"Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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