Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?
AbstractRecent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment, where we allow for both punishment and counter-punishment. We find that in both partner and stranger treatments cooperation declines over time. The reason is that people are less willing to punish under the threat of counter-punishment. Participants squander their endowment in costly confrontations leading to a relative payoff loss, in comparison to a treatment without punishments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 04/05.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision: Apr 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Experimental 0403001, EconWPA.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2004-08-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2004-08-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2004-08-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-08-09 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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