A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
AbstractThis paper provides a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary systematically the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished playerâs income, and we find that contributions to the public good increase monotonically in effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete contribution rates and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation found in the public-good game without punishment. In these cases, the possibility to punish may even worsen welfare. Finally, we show that punishment is a normal and inferior good.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Decentralized punishment; Punishment effectiveness; Public good; Welfare; C92; D70; H41;
Other versions of this item:
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/07, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2005.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003.
"Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,"
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- Noussair, C.N. & Masclet, D. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M..C, 2003. "Monetary and non-monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377951, Tilburg University.
- Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001. "Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1141, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Post-Print halshs-00151423, HAL.
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"The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods,"
200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
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"Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
982, The University of Melbourne.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2010. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 638-659, January.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2009. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003.
"Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism,"
2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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