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Is altruism bad for cooperation?

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  • Hwang, Sung-Ha
  • Bowles, Samuel

Abstract

Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of fellow citizens. Economists, however, have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self-interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. But this need not be the case. Behavioral experiments find that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel hostility towards free riders and enjoy inflicting harm on them, the incentives provided by the anticipated punishment support near efficient levels of contributions to a public good. Cooperation may also be supported if altruistic individuals internalize the group benefits that their contributions produce. But the effects of these two supports for high levels of cooperation may be less than additive. Using a utility function embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional altruism attenuates the punishment motive and thus may reduce the level of punishment inflicted on defectors, resulting in lower levels of contribution. Increases in altruism may also reduce the level of benefits from the public project net of contribution costs and punishment costs. The range over which altruism inhibits cooperation and reduces material payoffs is greater, the stronger is the reciprocity motive among group members.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 83 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 330-341

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:83:y:2012:i:3:p:330-341

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Keywords: Public goods; Altruism; Spite; Reciprocity; Punishment; Cooperation;

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Cited by:
  1. Centorrino, Samuele & Djemaï, Elodie & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Milinski, Manfred & Seabright, Paul, 2011. "Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 11-231, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Attila Ambrus & Ben Greiner, 2012. "Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3317-32, December.
  3. Ingela Alger & J�rgen W. Weibull, 2010. "Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1725-58, September.
  4. Kallis, Giorgos & Norgaard, Richard B., 2010. "Coevolutionary ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 690-699, February.

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