Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment - An experimental study
AbstractThis paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases both contributions and the average net payoffs of subjects. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship between the severity of punishment and average net payoffs. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a very severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2011-10.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
public good contribution experiments; imperfect monitoring; welfare implications of costly punishment;
Other versions of this item:
- Attila Ambrus & Ben Greiner, 2012. "Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3317-32, December.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-12-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-12-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-12-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-13 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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