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Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from public service delivery in Kenya

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  • Michael Mbate

Abstract

This article empirically examines how an individual's economic, social and political capital affects their propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an individual†level survey on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, but substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic corruption are strong and effective. The results also show that the incidence of bribery decreases when social capital is high but increases when political networks are prevalent. These findings support the need to combine anti†corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies and social policies in order to foster equity in public services provision in Kenya.

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  • Michael Mbate, 2018. "Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from public service delivery in Kenya," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(S1), pages 321-340, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:devpol:v:36:y:2018:i:s1:p:o321-o340
    DOI: 10.1111/dpr.12311
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    3. Kannan Perumal, 2021. "Rent seeking, supervisor approvals and conventional corruption control approach—an Indian experience," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 23(2), pages 357-376, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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