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How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

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  • Jennifer Hunt

Abstract

Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12490.

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Date of creation: Aug 2006
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Publication status: published as Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12490

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References

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  1. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Jennifer Hunt, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime," NBER Working Papers 10510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jennifer Hunt, 2006. "How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down," Departmental Working Papers 2006-07, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  4. Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2005. "Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-191, January.
  5. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2006. "Does corruption produce unsafe drivers?," Natural Field Experiments 00218, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Robin Thompson & Ana Xavier, 2002. "Unofficial Payments for Acute State Hospital Care In Kazakhstan. A Model of Physician Behaviour with Price Discrimination and Vertical Service Differentiation," LICOS Discussion Papers 12402, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  7. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  8. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," NBER Working Papers 6030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2007. "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1639-1676, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Working Paper Series rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  2. Artjoms Ivlevs & Timothy Hinks, 2013. "Global economic crisis and corruption experience: Evidence from transition economies," Working Papers 20131315, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
  3. Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2011. "Corruption in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 17398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jennifer Hunt, 2006. "How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down," Departmental Working Papers 2006-07, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  5. Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 17968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2012. "Corruption," Working Papers id:4952, eSocialSciences.
    • Banerjee, Abhijit & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2012. "Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp12-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  6. Justesen, Mogens K. & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2014. "Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 106-115.
  7. Martin Dufwenberg & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," Working Papers 515, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  8. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  9. Niehaus, Paul & Sukhtankar, Sandip, 2013. "The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 52-64.
  10. Ishita Chatterjee & Ranjan Ray, 2009. "Crime, Corruption and Institutions," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 20-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  11. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
  12. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2013. "Does Competition Among Public Officials Reduce Corruption? An Experiment," Departmental Working Papers 1301, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  13. Timothy Hinks & Artjoms Ivlevs, 2012. "Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist countries and Western Europe," Working Papers 20121208, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.

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