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Citizen Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa

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  • Bratton, Michael

Abstract

This article focuses on political relationships between citizens and local government in sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to leadership responsiveness. Cross-national survey data provide popular insights into performance. Citizens regard local councils as weak institutions with limited functions (rarely performed well) and elected councilors as largely unresponsive. Although civic activism is a corrective, people have yet to make use of tax payment as a device to hold councilors accountable. In endeavoring to improve client satisfaction, policy actors should attend as much to the procedural dimensions of local government performance as to the substance of service delivery.

Suggested Citation

  • Bratton, Michael, 2012. "Citizen Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 516-527.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:3:p:516-527
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 2000. "Taxation, coercion and donors. Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers 7, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sean Joss Gossel, 2020. "FDI and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 32(4), pages 1151-1172, September.
    2. Timmons, Jeffrey F. & Garfias, Francisco, 2015. "Revealed Corruption, Taxation, and Fiscal Accountability: Evidence from Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 13-27.
    3. Mershon, Carol, 2020. "What effect do local political elites have on infant and child death? Elected and chiefly authority in South Africa," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 251(C).
    4. Yohan Iddawela & Neil Lee & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2021. "Quality of Sub-national Government and Regional Development in Africa," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(8), pages 1282-1302, August.
    5. Michael Mbate, 2018. "Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from public service delivery in Kenya," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(S1), pages 321-340, March.
    6. Monika Bauhr & Nicholas Charron, 2018. "Why support International redistribution? Corruption and public support for aid in the eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 233-254, June.

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