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Rent seeking, supervisor approvals and conventional corruption control approach—an Indian experience

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  • Kannan Perumal

    (Alumnus of International Anti -Corruption Academy)

Abstract

This study challenges the argument that making it mandatory for the anti-corruption agencies to obtain prior supervisor approvals for detecting and prosecuting the corrupt can bring-in efficiency in corruption control. Applying the political economy concepts such as rents and rent seeking, this study explores the intricate relationships that exist between discretions available with the supervisors and their decisions of allowing the anti-corruption enforcement to detect and prosecute the public servants in corruption cases. The issue of similar facts getting differently appreciated by different public authorities has also been brought out by this study. This study argues that prior supervisor approvals in high discretionary and low risk environments can promote rent seeking behaviour in public organizations. Findings of this study show that limiting the discretions of authorities that decide supervisor approvals and holding them accountable for their decisions can be the conditions critical for efficient anti-corruption enforcement in India.

Suggested Citation

  • Kannan Perumal, 2021. "Rent seeking, supervisor approvals and conventional corruption control approach—an Indian experience," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 23(2), pages 357-376, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jsecdv:v:23:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s40847-021-00164-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s40847-021-00164-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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