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How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

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  • Hunt, Jennifer

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims’ demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims’ propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2278.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 84 (2), 574-589
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2278

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Keywords: development; bribery; corruption;

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References

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  1. Jennifer Hunt & Sonia Laszlo, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs?," NBER Working Papers 11635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," NBER Working Papers 6030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2006. "Does corruption produce unsafe drivers?," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website 00218, The Field Experiments Website.
  4. Jennifer Hunt, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime," NBER Working Papers 10510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Hunt, Jennifer, 2006. "How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down," IZA Discussion Papers 2278, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Xavier, Ana & Robin Thompson, 2003. "Unofficial payments for acute state hospital care in Kazakhstan. A model of physician behaviour with price discrimination and vertical service differentiation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society 224, Royal Economic Society.
  7. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2007. "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1639-1676, November.
  8. Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2005. "Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-191, January.
  9. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ishita Chatterjee & Ranjan Ray, 2009. "Crime, Corruption and Institutions," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics 20-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  2. Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 17968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Artjoms Ivlevs & Timothy Hinks, 2013. "Global economic crisis and corruption experience: Evidence from transition economies," Working Papers, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol 20131315, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
  4. Justesen, Mogens K. & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2014. "Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 106-115.
  5. Jennifer Hunt, 2006. "How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down," NBER Working Papers 12490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  7. Timothy Hinks & Artjoms Ivlevs, 2012. "Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist countries and Western Europe," Working Papers, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol 20121208, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
  8. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2013. "Does Competition Among Public Officials Reduce Corruption? An Experiment," Departmental Working Papers, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics 1301, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  9. Pande, Rohini, 2008. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  10. Niehaus, Paul & Sukhtankar, Sandip, 2013. "The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 52-64.
  11. Martin Dufwenberg & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 515, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  12. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
  13. Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2011. "Corruption in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 17398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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